

CPD Conference on
Development with Equity and Justice
Immediate Tasks for the Newly Elected Government

Dhaka; 28-29 March 2009
Bangladesh-China Friendship Conference Centre

Parallel Session II

100-DAY EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROGRAMME IN BANGLADESH
CHALLENGES OF EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

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29 March 2009



CENTRE FOR POLICY DIALOGUE (CPD)
B A N G L A D E S H
a c i v i l s o c i e t y t h i n k - t a n k

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Section I _____

Introduction

Employment generation has been recognized as an important instrument for reducing poverty in developing and least developed countries. The fundamental idea behind establishing such correlation is that these countries are characterised not only by high unemployment leading to high poverty, but also natural disasters and economic & political inabilities which affects the effort towards economic development. This includes natural shocks such as flood, cyclone and drought, global economic shocks such as commodity price hikes and recession, and domestic political shocks such as lack of democracy and conflicts. Additionally, these are also countries with less resources and high budget deficits which constraint their efforts to ensure livelihoods for all. Often, a large section of people, particularly in the rural areas, remain outside the main activities of the economy due to their lack of capabilities in terms of income and resource constraints. The creation of wage employment programmes for these people has been proved to be successful to alleviate poverty and advance the rural economy in some of these countries. These programmes have not always been safety nets in nature, but more catered for development through employment generation in the rural areas. In several countries in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America including Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cambodia, China, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Malawi, Namibia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Tanzanian, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe rural employment creation programmes have been undertaken at various scales that resulted in positive impacts of various degrees.

The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) had embarked on creating employment for the rural poor in the mid 1970s through a number of activities such as the Food for Works Programme (FFW), Rural Maintenance Programme (RMP), Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) and Test Relief (TR). These food-waged employment programmes engage the landless and marginal rural population in activities such as rural road construction and maintenance, digging, irrigation channels, flood control and embankments. Notwithstanding several limitations related to designing and implementation (IFPRI, 1986) these programmes have, by and large, been playing a vital role in the social protection of the vulnerable groups in Bangladesh.

Given the fact that 25 per cent of Bangladesh's total population still remains in the category of extreme poverty (according the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2005), the need for government sponsored employment creation programmes cannot be underplayed. In the backdrop of volatility of international prices of commodities, global financial crisis and seasonal unemployment in some parts of the country, expansion of these programmes is well justified. From that perspective, the initiation of the 100-Day Employment Generation Programme (100-DEGP) by the GoB in FY2008-09 is a commendable step to address poverty. As a matter of fact, in view of the high inflationary pressure and seasonal unemployment during September to November, particularly in the areas which are prone to river erosion, flood and monga, the GoB decided to initiate the 100-DEGP. This new programme, which is an addition to the existing SSNP for the poor aims to reduce poverty by providing employment to the extreme poor during the lean season or by giving cash to them in case of failure to provide employment. Resource poor people from all 64 districts are intended to be covered under this programme which is planned to be implemented in two phases in a year. The first phase is the slant period that is between mid-September to end of November and the second phase is between March to end of April. An amount of 20 billion taka (equivalent to around USD 290 million) has been allocated in the budget of FY2008-09 for the programme targeting 2 million people for employment.

The 100-DEGP is the largest and first of its kind to alleviate poverty and hunger which guarantees employment and income in the short run and develop rural economy in the long run by building rural infrastructure in Bangladesh. Hence, the efficiency of the programme is the most important determinant to achieve such goals. Now that the first phase of the programme has been carried out during September to November 2008, an early assessment of the programme can shed lights on the underlying achievements and shortcomings on the basis of which decisions as regards its continuity or operational modality can be made by the policy makers. While there have been several newspaper reports and evaluations by some organisations on the 100-DEGP, these are far less comprehensive to cover all aspects of the 100-DEGP. The current study by the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) assesses the administrative, financial and distributional aspects of the programme and makes policy recommendations to make the 100-DEGP more effective.

Section II _____

Design of the Study

2.1 Objectives and Scope of the Study

The key objective of this study is to evaluate the 100-DEGP on the basis of field level experiences and draw lessons for providing feedback to the policy makers in order for them to make informed policy decisions as regards the 100-DEGP in future. To this end, the paper will investigate the early impacts of the programme on beneficiaries focusing on the design, implementation and monitoring mechanism. Specific objectives of this study are:

- a) to review the design and implementation of the programme;
- b) to have a sense of the beneficiaries' and other stakeholders' (mainly providers, eg. UP Chairmen and Members, and NGOs) perception of the impacts of the programme;
- c) to review the experiences of similar programmes in other countries for addressing related problems of such programmes; and
- d) to suggest policy recommendations for fine tuning the programme design and enhancing effective implementation during the second phase.

The study is only a first order assessment of the newly initiated 100-DEGP and does not attempt to do any impact analysis of the programme. Thus socio-economic impact of the programme on the extreme poor in terms of increase in income and reduction in incidence of poverty are not within the scope of the paper. Since the programme has started its operation only in 2008, such exercise cannot be undertaken at this early stage.

2.2 Research Questions

In order to fulfill the above objectives, this study attempts to address the following questions:

- How good have been the design and preparation of the 100-DEGP?
- How well has the targeting done in reaching the extreme poor? Has the beneficiary selection criterion been inclusive in nature? Has the selection criterion of beneficiaries been followed strictly? Was the participation of female workers satisfactory?
- How 100-DEGP can be compared with other antipoverty programmes in Bangladesh?
- What are the direct benefits of the 100-DEGP to the poor?
- Are the jobs created and income provided through the 100-DEGP enough? Is there a need for scaling up?
- Has the selection of projects under the 100-DEGP been correct in terms of type of the work and choice of time?
- What was the extent of leakage in terms of providing employment to non-target groups and misappropriation of 100-DEGP funds by the implementing authorities and agencies?
- How the misappropriation of 100-DEGP funds can be reduced and how can more transparency in fund usage be ensured? Are the accountability mechanisms and transparency of the 100-DEGP adequate to reduce leakage of funds?
- How good were the monitoring and coordination of the 100-DEGP? Are the delivery and recipient systems clear and integrated?

2.3 Methodology and Sources of Data

The study is primarily based on information from field level investigation of the 100-DEGP. In order to address the research questions the study team gathered information from three districts, namely *Nilphamary*, *Jamalpur* and *Naryanganj*. These districts were selected in view of their unique socio-economic characteristics. For example, Nilphamary is a monsoon prone area, Jamalpur is affected by river erosion and Narayanganj¹ is close to the capital city Dhaka where most economic activities are performed. A total of 9 Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted during the field visits, out of which 6 were performed among the beneficiaries and 3 were conducted with the service providers including government officials, Chairman and Members of Upazila Parishad. A semi structured questionnaire was used to elicit information on various aspects of the 100-DEGP from the field. The questionnaire, thus, included questions as regards income, employment, expenditure, assets, food insecurity and necessity of the continuation of the programme.

On average 15 individuals participated in each FGD which took place during February - March 2009 in 6 randomly selected unions under 4 upazilas of the 3 districts (Table 1). In addition to FGDs, a rapid appraisal was also carried out among 112 individuals in the areas under the present study to have their perception on the programme. This was done in order to accumulate their views on the 100-DEGP in terms of benefits, loopholes and ways to improve the programme.

Table 1: Distribution of beneficiaries and areas under field investigation

District	Upazilla	Union	Number of sample beneficiaries	
			Male	Female
Nilphamari	Sadar	Luxmichup	20	20
	Sadar	Kundupukur	25	10
	Sadar	Charaikhola	10	10
Jamalpur	Islampur	Kulkandi	15	2

A debriefing session was held as well with the responsible officials working at the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management. The report also draws information and findings from existing literature on various SSNPs in Bangladesh and across the world.

The analytical approach of the study is qualitative. Based on the information from FGDs, perception survey and debriefing sessions, the paper presents a review of the experiences on the current developments of the 100-DEGP at the field level.

2.4 Layout of the Paper

The rest of the report is organised in the following manner. Section III presents an overview of the SSNPs in Bangladesh with particular focus on the 100-DEGP. The findings of the field level investigations are presented in Section IV. This section reviews the design, implementation and monitoring of the 100-DEGP based on the information from the FGDs. Finally, Section V provides a number of conclusions and policy recommendations.

¹ In Narayanganj a FGD was conducted among the service providers including government officials, Chairman and Members of Upazila Parishad.

Section III _____

A Brief Overview of the Employment Generation Programmes

3.1 Major safety net programmes

While addressing poverty in Bangladesh, it is viewed from two broad perspectives namely income poverty and human poverty. Employment generating programmes and direct transfers for the poor are used as a tool to address income poverty. Programmes focusing on areas such as education, health, nutrition and water and sanitation are targeted to mitigate human poverty. Safety net programmes are considered as direct measures which are devised to address both income and human poverty. Examples of indirect or growth oriented measures include mostly infrastructure development and rehabilitation programmes. However, there are safety net programmes that are both direct and indirect in nature. For an example, direct measures like FFW programme, targeted towards the poor is used to construct infrastructure, also falls in the category of indirect measure.

The modality of support under SSNPs can be direct cash transfer and support through creating opportunity for income. Programmes such as old-age allowance, allowance for the widow, deserted and destitute women, honorarium for insolvent freedom fighters, assistance to the fully retarded, fund for mitigating risk due to natural disaster, fund for rehabilitation of the acid burnt women and physically handicapped and maternity allowance for the poor lactating mother are among the few to be mentioned in the direct support category. As has already been mentioned in Section I, there are also programmes for the seasonally unemployed poor which are undertaken under the SSNPs. Some of these include 100-DEGP, FFW, VGD, TR, Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets (REOPA), Employment Generation for Hard Core Poor, and Rural Employment and Road Maintenance Programme (RMP). A summary of major types of social safety net programmes are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Major types of safety net programmes in Bangladesh

<p><u>Employment Generation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food for Work (FFW) • Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) employment • Test Relief (TR) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Targeted to the rural poor for working on various public works projects • Programme for training, credit and employment for low income women in the rural areas • Provides employment for the very poor through programmes for the development and maintenance of rural infrastructure
<p><u>Cash Transfer Payments</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stipends for Primary Education • Stipend for girls secondary education • Gratuitous Relief (GR) • Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) • Pure Transfer Payments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Targeted to low income households as an incentives to keep their children in school • Targeted to enhance girls attendance in secondary school • Provides emergency short term relief to disaster victims • Provides food grains on a short term basis to disaster victims • Includes allowances for - Distressed, widowed or divorced women, - old age allowances, - cash assistance for the low income freedom fighters, - funds for the homeless.

Source: GoB 2008, Hossian and Osman 2007

3.2 Allocation for safety net programmes

Though the allocation for SSNPs is gradually increasing over the years, its share in total public expenditure has been on the wane since 1998-99 till 2007. On average, during 1996-97 to 2004-05 period, the share of expenditure on SSNPs was 0.8 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 5.7 percent of the total public expenditure (World Bank, 2006). However, during FY2007 and FY2008, higher allocations were made for SSNPs. In FY2007, total allocation for safety net programmes was 9.3 percent of the budget and 1.4 percent of the GDP, which increased to 13.32 percent of the revised budget of FY08 and 1.8 percent of total GDP. In FY 2009 the share has been increased further to 16.94 percent of the total budget and 2.76 percent of the GDP. Apart from government initiatives, a number of non-government organisations (NGOs) are also engaged in operating various SSNPs for the poor. Table 3 presents the trend in government expenditure on SSNPs in Bangladesh during 1996 - 2007.

Table 3: Average expenditure (allocation) on SSNPs

(Crore Taka)

Avg 1996-97 to 2000-01	Avg 2001-02 to 2004-05	Avg 2006-07 to 2007-08
1947	2270	7053

Source: World Bank, 2006; Budget Documents, GoB.

In FY2007-08 about 8.6 percent of total safety net expenditure in Bangladesh was spent to create employment opportunities for the poor and vulnerables. This is in addition to other micro credit programmes that also support programmes for employment creation. An amount of Tk 47,370 million has been allocated in the budget of FY2008-09 of which more than 42 percent has been allocated for the 100-DEGP. Table 4 gives details on various employment generation programmes including allocation in the budget FY2008-09.

Table 4: Employment Generation Programs (excluding micro-credit based programmes)

	Objectives	Targeting/ Eligibility criterion	Implementation	Coverage FY 08-09	Budget Allocation FY 08-09 TK million
100-DEGP	Employment for extreme rural poor unemployed people/ increasing purchasing power of extreme poor affected by price hike	Extreme poor and permanent capable resident and marginal farmers in rural areas(esp. vulnerable areas)/ Eager to work but unemployed and unskilled poor people / Landless Not Permanent or temporary farm laborer/ Not benefiting from other on going SSN	MoFDM	200 million person days	20,000
FFW	Employment generation for the poor in slack season/ Dvlpt. and maintenance of rural infrastructure	Landless, women heads hhs, day labor and temporary workers, people with income less than 300 Tk/ month	GoB/ ADB/ WFP and MoLGD, MSW and MWR	4.7 million person months	15,776
Test Relief	Employment generation for poverty stricken people in rainy season/ dvlpt maintenance of rural infrastructure	Poverty stickiness areas	GOP/DPs/MoFDM	1.9 million person months	6,315

	Objectives	Targeting/ Eligibility criterion	Implementation	Coverage FY 08-09	Budget Allocation FY 08-09 TK million
Food Support for Chittagong Hill Tracts	Employment generation/ Infrastructure dvlp.	-	GOB/MCHT	0.74 million person months	2,379
Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets (REOPA)	Empowerment of women/ Rural infrastructure maintenance	Hhs with less than 0.3 ha of land/ female headed hhs/ Hhs with no other income and not participating in other targeted programs	GOB/EC/MoLGD	24,000 women	
Employment Generation for Hard Core Poor		-	PKSF	0.1 million individuals	1,000
Rural Employment and Road Maintenance Program		-	MoLGD	5 million individuals	1,900

Source: GoB (2008b); WB (2008) cited in BRAC, 2009

3.3 Phase - I of the 100-DEGP

The 100-DEGP has been designed to cover 20 lakh beneficiaries. By the end of the first phase of the programme, the actual number of beneficiaries was 12,08,577, out of which 9,15,050 were male and 2,93,527 were female. This implies that the targeted coverage was not achieved during the first phase of the programme. This has resulted in unutilisation of the allocated budget for the programme. For the first 60 work-days, an amount of Tk. 9135.32 million was disbursed against the allocation of Tk. 12000 million. From a pool of 1,53,795 approved projects, 1,00,775 projects had been started. However, during the 60 days of the phase, only 50,908 projects could be completed.

Table 5: 100- DEGP during Phase - I

Total Population Coverage	
Estimated	
<i>Male</i>	Not Specified
<i>Female</i>	Not Specified
<i>Total</i>	19,97,075
Actual Average/day	
<i>Male</i>	14,44,921
<i>Female</i>	3,48,798
<i>Total</i>	17,93,720
No. of district covered	64
Total allocation (Tk million)	12,000
Total disbursement (Tk million)	915,47,25,305
No. of approved project	1,48,228
No of starts project	1,01,059
No of completed projects	51,207

Source: Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, GoB.

The Guideline of the 100-DEGP spells out that based on the local demands, the local Chairman should propose project plans to the UNO who would approve the projects in consultation with the District Commissioner (DC). The proposed projects should be of the following types: *pond and canal excavation, re-excavation; construction and reconstruction of roads and dams; compost fertilizer; drainage for removing water logging; filling grounds of various organisations; waste removal; afforestation; reconstruction of houses destroyed by natural hazards; grass plantation and vegetable cultivation; resist Jatka fishing, etc* (Table 6).

Table 6: Projects undertaken during the 100-DEGP

Division	Compost / Biofertilizer	Reconstruction of houses destroyed by natural disaster	Ground filling of houses	Construction/reconstruction road and embankment	Digging and dredging of drainage to remove water logging	Afforestation/ grassing/ vegetable cultivation	Digging and dredging of canals and old pond.	Waste removal	Ground filling of social welfare institutions	Others	Total
Dhaka	3261	1	16	26246	271	135	472	916	3789	51	35158
Chittagong	4405	22	0	20472	433	147	2412	756	2486	698	31831
Sylhet	276	7	1	8479	458	27	214	346	656	50	10514
Khulna	1216	278	3	10601	245	6	580	208	1825	187	15149
Barishal	1883	0	65	7538	136	41	609	101	871	115	11359
Rajshahi	3487	4	310	29553	821	137	619	295	8635	356	44217
total	14528	312	395	102889	2364	493	4906	2622	18262	1457	148228

Source: MoFDM 2009.

3.4 100-DEGP compared with other SSNPs

According to the latest official data from the HIES, 13.1 per cent of the households in Bangladesh were under the safety net coverage in 2005 (Table 7). Division-wise distribution of beneficiary households shows that the highest share of households receiving benefits from SSNPs was in Sylhet division (22.4 per cent) and the lowest in Khulna Division (9.5 per cent). However, according to Division-wise poverty data percentage of people living below poverty line was second lowest in Sylhet and third highest in Khulna. It is clear from Table 7 that safety net programmes were not undertaken with proper consideration of regional incidence of poverty.

Table 7: Spatial poverty rates (2005) and distribution of beneficiaries in SSNPs

Division	Poverty head count rate (%)	Beneficiary households (%)		
	Upper poverty line	Total	Rural	Urban
Dhaka	32.0	14.3	20.0	4.9
Barisal	52.0	13.3	14.8	5.0
Chittagong	34.0	11.1	12.9	5.7
Khulna	45.7	9.5	11.0	4.2
Rajshahi	51.2	12.4	13.0	7.7
Sylhet	33.8	22.4	24.3	11.3
National	40.0	13.1	15.6	5.5

Source: BBS 2005.

As opposed to the expenditure pattern of SSNP,s the 100-DEGP addressed the regional inequality in a better manner. The 100-DEGP is better designed to address the regional variations in poverty since the distribution of beneficiary households are in line with the extent of poverty across most of the divisions (Table 8). However, there is further scope to increase the allocative efficiency of the programmes in terms of regional concentration of this programme.

Table 8: Poverty rates (2005) and spatial distribution of beneficiaries in 100-DEGP

Division	Poverty head count rate (%), 2005		No of registered beneficiaries	Beneficiary households (%)
	Upper poverty line	Lower poverty line		
Dhaka	32.0	19.9	539895	6.10
Barisal	52.0	36.5	142180	7.68
Chittagong	34.0	16.1	321680	5.85
Khulna	45.7	31.6	219400	6.59
Rajshahi	51.2	34.5	656520	9.60
Sylhet	33.8	20.8	117400	6.53
National	40.0	25.1	1997075	7.09

Source: GoB, 2009; BBS 2005.

Note: Population has been calculated average 1.58 percent yearly incremental considering the baseline of 2001 census (M/O Finance). Average household size has been calculated 4.85 persons considering HIES 2005

3.5 100-DEGP compared with similar programmes in other countries

In the literature, there are debates as to what should be the focus of such programmes. Debates centered around the idea of work “wide coverage with flexible wage rate (WIDCOV)” and “limited coverage at a socially determined minimum wage (LIMCOV)”. Arguments have also been made for and against two similar concepts of programmes such as the labour based approaches in infrastructure programmes (LBIPs) and employment based safety net programmes (EBSNs). The LIMCOV and LBIPs fix wage rate higher and have greater potential for poverty reduction while WIDCOV and EBSNs are more effective at achieving broad based poverty reduction by offering work to all who want it at any wage rate. However, depending on the requirement countries may opt for programmes which are most suitable for them.

One of the most successful programmes in ensuring employment and income to the poor is the National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG) programme in India which has been initiated after the encouraging performance of Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in Maharashtra in the 1970s. The NREG has made it obligatory on the state governments to provide 100 days of paid work to at least one member from each household who may be in need of work. This programme was operationalised in 2006-07 in 200 of India’s poorest districts and then was extended to 330 poorest districts in 2007-2008; in FY2008-09, the programme has been extended to 596 districts. The NREG generated 905 million person days of employment in 2006-07 which extended to 1437 million person days with the expansion of the programme in 2007-08. One study indicates that the NREG provided work, albeit for less than 100 days, to around 21 million persons in 2006-07 and 34 million in 2007-08 (Mehra 2008).

Though conceptualised in a similar the 100-DEGP in Bangladesh is different from the NREG in many respects. Since the EGS and NREG have been in operation for a long period the experience of these programmes and other successful programmes around the world can be useful for Bangladesh. Table 9 presents a comparison of the Bangladesh 100-DEGP, Indian NREGA and Argentine TRABAJAR.

Table 9: Comparison among the Bangladesh 100-DEGP, the Indian NREGA and Argentina’s TRABAJAR

	Bangladesh 100-DEGP	Indian NREGA	Argentina TRABAJAR
Strategic goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create employment for extreme/unemployed poor in rural areas; • Increase purchasing power of extreme poor people affected by price hike; • Develop/maintain small scale infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhance the livelihood security of people in rural areas • Create durable assets and sustain livelihood resource 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide temporary income support to poor, unemployed workers.

	Bangladesh 100-DEGP	Indian NREGA	Argentina TRABAJAR
Coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Targeted to physically and mentally able poor/unskilled unemployed poor No gender target Excludes persons covered by other SSNs Only one member per household Age range: 18 to 50 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Every HH adult member willing to perform unskilled manual work; 1/3 employed has to be women. More than one member can apply; No restriction regarding participation in other safety nets Age range: Minimum: 18 – No upper age limit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Targeted to poor, unemployed workers. No gender target
Implementation Aspects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nationwide: 64 districts, 480 upazilas, in two phases, matching to lean periods. 	<p>Piloting:</p> <p>Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme in 1972</p> <p>Two Phases:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Phase 1: (200 districts) - 2006; Phase 2 (130 districts in 2007-08), others from April onward <p>Act notified in 2005 to cover whole country by 2010;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Geographically targeting poverty prone areas.
Implementation Period	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 100 days during lean seasons (mid – September to end November) and March-April. For natural disaster programme can be launched any time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 100 days per household at any time throughout the year 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Throughout the year. Each of the taken projects must be completed within 4-6 months and can employ no more than 100 persons.
Past experiences with Public Rural Employment Schemes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Long Rural Manpower Scheme (1960), Crash Scheme for Rural Employment (1971-72); Maharashtra programme initiated in 1972; Food for Work Programme (1977) transformed into National Rural Employment Programme, National Food for Work Programme (2005). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In the 90s: series of short-term public employment programs named PIT ("intensive work program") TRABAJAR replaced the old programme in March 1996,
Provision of Legal Obligations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No statutory work guarantee 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Scheme backed by Parliament NREG Act emphasizing the right to work and guaranteed employment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No statutory work guarantee
Budgetary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project-wise allocations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Central government bears 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initially funded by the

	Bangladesh 100-DEGP	Indian NREGA	Argentina TRABAJAR
Commitments	<p>fixed within the limits of the funds.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Administrative expenses borne by the Government 	<p>entire wage costs of projects for unskilled workers;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Funds released based on project appraisal 	<p>government</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Later, the government sought external assistance
Institutional Settings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Four tier: Central, Government/District/upa zila and Union Parishad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multi-tier set-up of : Central Government; State District Panchayat, District Programme Officer; Intermediary Panchayat, Block Programme Officer; Gram Panchayat (execute 50per cent of works) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multi-tier set-up of : Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MTSS), Municipalities, provinces, national agencies, NGOs and/or private organizations.
Beneficiary selection procedure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consultations to be held with stakeholders at union level, which to be approved at upazila level by the UNO . 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interested households have to apply for registration to local Gram Panchayat. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Targeting mechanism is the low wage rate. With a wage rate lower than market rate Considered to be self-selection.
Works category	<p>Preparation of compost heap for cultivated land, road/barrage construction; repair of houses affected by natural calamities, pond/canal excavation; afforestation and vegetable grass cultivation on Government land; canal irrigation/construction for removing water logging; removal of sweeping and waste materials - Other agricultural production activities , as approved by the MoFDM/ National Steering Committee</p>	<p>Water conservation and harvesting, drought proofmg (afforestation, tree planting); irrigation facilities for HHs belonging to 'scheduled castes or scheduled tribes', renovation of traditional water bodies, land development, flood control, rural connectivity (all-weather roads); any other work notified by Central Government.</p>	<p>Minor construction, repair, expansion, or remodeling of schools, health facilities, basic sanitation facilities, small roads and bridges, small dams and canals, community kitchens and centers, tourist centers, and low-cost housing.</p>
Works selection	<p><u>Preparation:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Union Parishad – Ward members) based on consultation with identified stakeholders; final work list to be approved by UNO <p><u>Selection criteria:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> to be consistent with the Guidelines; no minimum labour requirements and or minimum labour intensity ratio; more than one project can be taken in one area 	<p><u>Preparation:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual plan for the village by each Gram Panchayat, in consultation with Gram Shabhas, which are ultimately consolidated and approved at District level; Work proposals to be implemented by agencies (in most cases Gram Panchayat) as designated by the states or the Centre. <p><u>Selection Criteria:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work proposals to be consistent with the list of permissible works under the Act 	<p><u>Preparation:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A participatory approach incorporated into operations. Projects can be proposed by local governments, community groups or NGOS. All subproject applications are to be evaluated by professionals according to a methodology which incorporates a comprehensive review of each proposed sub-project. <p><u>Selection Criteria:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project selection process places emphasis on

	Bangladesh 100-DEGP	Indian NREGA	Argentina TRABAJAR
			<p>targeting poor areas to receive projects.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This geographic targeting mechanism is part of a points system used in sub-project prioritization. • Neighborhoods and municipalities of the target groups are promoted as potential recipients for projects that in turn provide opportunities for self-selection.
Allocation and Implementation of Works	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Works have to be completed within 90 and 60 days of receiving fund for the first and second phase. • UNO to supervise officers, disseminate publicly declare list of projects/capable persons in open ward meeting • Project Implementation Committees, formed by Union Committees are responsible for execution of all projects • Relevant government agencies are to provide technical assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timeframe is specific to each approved work • Works allocated to any applicants by Gram Panchayat and Block Implementation officer; • Priority to 'old works' within the plan; • New works initiated only if there are at least 10 labourers (formerly 50) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sub-projects must be completed within 4-6 months and can employ no more than 100 persons. • The initial step after sub-project approval and funding is for the executing agency to present the Provincial Manager of Employment and Training Programs with a list of workers for the project. • Approved and prioritized sub-projects are funded up to the limit set by the available funds
Technical Assistance Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guidelines do not contain any such provisions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central Government supports administrative expenses. • Training of stakeholders at all levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The MTSS provides promotional and training activities.
Wage and Disbursement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uniform wage of taka 100/day/person. • Wages are to be disbursed on daily basis payment by Union Committee through government schedule banks • at the upazila level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimum wage rates for agricultural labourers, (set in the Minimum Wage Act 1948, not less than 60 Rs/day) • Wages can be paid in cash or kind (foodgrain), but 25per cent at least in cash • Wages are to be paid on weekly basis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wage is lower than average market wage rate and it is paid through cheques. • Paid through checks. • Cheques are issued to each worker once a month for the previous month's work. • Depending on the location of the sub-project, workers either receive their checks at a bank, or the post office.
Employment guarantee vs. employment generation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No legal gurantee to provide job within 15 days of registration/issue of card. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jobs to be provided by Gram Panchayat within 15 days • from application receipt date, as stated by the Act 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No such provisions

	Bangladesh 100-DEGP	Indian NREGA	Argentina TRABAJAR
Unemployment Allowance	<p><u>Eligibility:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15 days after registration if no employment provided • Amount: 40Tk first 30 days/ 50Tk day for the remaining period • Payment by Union Committee through government schedule bank at upazila level <p><u>Conditionality:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment stopped if work can be made available; • Allowance is not given, if applicant is absent from • works for which he registered. 	<p><u>Eligibility:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If no employment is provided within 15 days after submission of application • Amount: no less than one-fourth of the wage rate for the first 30 days after a person becomes eligible for unemployment allowance, and no less than one-half of the wage after that. <p><u>Conditionality:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Applicants have to report for work within 15 days of being informed by Gram Panchayat. • Not applicable if time period for which work is sought runs out 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not such provision.
Provision of Worksite Facilities and other Social Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not specified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory provision of facilities such as creche, drinking water, shade for children • Entitlement to free medical treatment for injury, a payments to legal heirs of deceased/disabled workers; • A person may be entrusted (and paid by the program) if more than 5 children are brought on work sites with their parents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not specified
Physical Access to Jobs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No limit distance to work sites 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work to be provided within 5km of the village, if not, wage premium of 10 per cent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Projects were selected and implemented within the locality.
Communication Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Registration notice may be hanged in open space'; • Union supervising officer nominated by UNO declare list of projects and capable persons in open-ward meeting in presence of beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Various Information Educational and Communication Strategies; • Gram Sabha are responsible to inform key features of the Act 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not specified •
Monitoring and financial auditing	<p><u>Monitoring responsibilities:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Upazila Disaster Management Committee, District committees, <p><u>Audit:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generic provision that 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutions and Processes National Level Monitors which follow Guidelines Special Monitoring Scheme by National Level Monitors Local Monitoring and Vigilance Committees; Independent monitors; 	<p><u>Monitoring</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Previously formulated monitoring indicators are used by MTSS, implementing organizations, the World Bank, and the IDB. • The program also has a

	Bangladesh 100-DEGP	Indian NREGA	Argentina TRABAJAR
	<p>'the government will take necessary arrangement for auditing the programme in consultation with Controller and Auditor General'</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme reviews by Ministry of Rural Development; • Regional Performance Review Committees Audit; • Financial audit is mandatory and must be carried out by each district at the end of the final year either by local fund auditors or chartered accounts 	<p>built-in monitoring device.</p> <p><u>Evaluation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As projects are evaluated and completed, a database on prices of materials as well as unit costs is built up in order to be used as a basis for comparison with subsequent sub-project proposals. • As part of the overall program evaluation, a survey instrument is being used to determine the direct benefits of a random sample of TRABAJAR workers for particular sub-projects. These survey results are compared with those of a control group selected from the population at large. • The indirect benefits of the projects financed through TRABAJAR will be measured by ex-post evaluations of a random sample of projects.
Accountability and Transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guidelines and monitoring sheet are available on the internet • Implementation guidelines do not contain specific provisions regarding public disclosure of monitoring information <p><u>Grievance remedy:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • District Committee responsible for grievance redress; no clear mechanism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People can ask for copies of all records and accounts, as well as muster rolls <p>Implementation followed-up by</p> <p>NGO groups independent groups</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On-line access to monitoring information; • Annual reports on outcomes to the Parliament <p><u>Grievance remedy:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • District programme coordinator is responsible for disposal of grievances – setting up of grievance redressal cells at programme offices; Grievances are to be reviewed on a monthly basis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not specified

Source: Adopted from EGRIA (2008), GoB (2008), BRAC (2009) and Eisenstadt, K (1998)

Table 10: Similarities and differences: 100-DEGP and NREGA

		100-DEGP	NREGA
Similarities	Objectives	Emphasizing employment provision for poor and vulnerable people linked to rural infrastructure development	
	Type of works/selection of works	In both cases agriculture disaster control/flood control, removal of water logging, irrigation, rural connectivity has been mentioned.	
	Employment/unemployment provisions	In both cases beneficiaries can only avail 100 days of work, employment should be guaranteed within 15 days of the card issues and unemployment allowance is to be provided under certain conditions.	
	Wage and unemployment allowance	Both cases the rate of unemployment allowance appeared to be the same	
	Implementing agency	In both cases lower tier of the local government were responsible. In Bangladesh it was in union level and in India it was Gram Panchayat.	
Differences	Selection of works	Top-down, short tern focus	Bottom-up, long term development focus.
	Selection process	Identification of beneficiaries followed several steps comprising union level and Chairmen level	Based on self selection and individual application
	Institutional Approach	Lacks institutional approach as due to any legal measures employment generation confines to only employment generation	The Indian State Employment Gurantee schemes are backed by a Parliant Act, the NREGA. The ACT has come after many years since the programme operated in different parts.
	Supporting Role by other Institutes	Absence of freedom of information act creates constraints to the programme	Freedom of information act facilitates the schemes transparent and accountable in broader degree.
	Timing	Time bound with two phases	Can be implemented through out the year.
	Coverage	Extensive coverage comprising all districts immediately since the inception of the programme	Did piloting in Maharastra state during 1970s. Now the programmne covers 330 districts among the 500.
	Beneficiary Unit	Beneficiary Unit is selected household member	While in India it is household means other member of the house can participate.
	Upper age limit	Fix to age 50	Not fixed
	Gender Dimensions	No quota for women	One third of the beneficiaries must be women

Source: Adopted from EGR1 (2008), GoB (2008)

Section IV _____

100-DEGP in Bangladesh: Findings from the Field Investigation

The government has completed the implementation of the first phase of the 100 Day Employment Generation Programme (100 DEGP) which created employment for a couple of months (60 days). According to the government's achievement record, 76.1 per cent of the allocation for the first phase was disbursed creating employment for 19.9 lakh hard core poor who were the beneficiaries of the programme. Achievement and progress for the first phase of the programme is presented in Annex (X). A six-member team from the Center for Policy Dialogue (CPD) visited the districts of Nilphamari, Jamalpur and Narayanganj to study the progress of the programme and to observe the situation at the field level. For the assessment, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were held with both the beneficiaries and the providers. A rapid perception survey with regard to the effectiveness of the programme was conducted with the beneficiaries of Nilphamari and Jamalpur districts. Assessment of the first phase (through FGD) was based on the programme's "Guidelines". Field findings, presented in this section, presents views both from the beneficiaries and the providers. Before proceeding with the discussion and analysis of the 100 DEGP, it is worth underlining here that since the programme is the first of its kind, and it has been difficult to set benchmarks (since the programme was implemented w/o a comprehensive household survey), evaluation of such a programme had its benefits.

4.1 Assessment of Design and Planning of the 100 DEGP

Groundwork and Guideline

The 100 DEGP certainly is a massive effort to accommodate 2 million rural hardcore and seasonally unemployed poor under the social safety net. Groundwork plays a decisive role in achieving success in such types of programmes. After the official declaration of the programme on 15 August 2008, the stakeholders had only two weeks in hand to prepare and plan for the colossal programme, since the Guideline instructed to commence the programme within a month, by September. However, it must be remembered that the programme was inaugurated at an almost crisis situation when the poor people of the country were finding it difficult to survive in the face of high food and essential prices. The objectives of the programme, hence also acted as a safeguard to protect the poor's incomes. The objectives also indicate the strategic importance of the programme's preparation which was rather limited. Accordingly, due to limited ground work there remained a deficit in terms of providing employment for 60 days, as a result of the lack of preparation during the project formulation stage.

The Guideline forms the basis of the design and implementation of the programme. Again, pointing to the lack of preparedness, the Guideline was not provided to all the stakeholders in time. UP Chairmen and members, who were the key players during the implementation phase, had the least idea with regard to the legal context of the programme. Besides, the Guideline itself suffers from lack of clarity in terms of both designing the approach and implementation at the root levels. Many of the instructions have indefinite and often mixed meanings, and thus have left a lot of ambiguities and scopes for leakage.

Awareness

As a result of lack of preparation time, awareness regarding the 100 DEGP has been at an abysmally low level. Almost none of the beneficiaries had any idea about the details of the programme. The mass awareness had been generated in other social safety net (SSN) programmes including VGD and FFW, thanks to effective preparatory planning and groundwork.

4.2 Targeting

The programme's strength lies with its target-oriented approach. The programme aimed to be implemented in a fixed time period in order to help a certain group of beneficiaries. However, lack of monitoring of selection process, and the field survey findings revealed the inclusion of non-poor in the list of the beneficiaries. Though beneficiaries ought to be members of the poorest segment of the society and those who were excluded from other existing SSNs, a number of cases were encountered where the targeting revealed adverse selection. Some beneficiaries were found who were not under

the hardcore poverty line; with some of them owning productive assets. On a different note, survey findings revealed that many beneficiaries of the 100-DEGP were covered by other existing SSNs.

In view of the above, it can be stated that the success of the SSN programme in reaching the real poor has been somewhat inaccurate. According to HIES 2005, safety-net programmes mainly targets the population categorised as “Very Poor” (Table 11).

Table 11: Targeting criteria used by safety net programmes

Criteria	per cent of total beneficiaries
Very poor	61.55
Widow, separated	7.78
Landless	7.12
No earner	1.58
Crippled	0.35
Disabled/illness	1.52
Old age	5.58
Freedom fighter	11.82
Other	0.49

Source: HIES 2005

However, as identified by various studies, there are some clear indications of leakages. World Bank assessed that 27 percent of VGD beneficiaries are not poor (World Bank). Ahmed and Shaikh identified that 11 percent of participants of the Primary Education Stipend Program (PESP) met none of the eligibility criteria for program participation. Ahmed () identified that almost 47 percent of beneficiaries of the PESP are non-poor and thereby inappropriately included in the program.

Regional targeting has always been one of the approaches of safety net programmes in Bangladesh. Seasonal Unemployment Reduction Fund, kept in the safety-net programme for FY2008, was supposed to target regions characterised by high and seasonal poverty. However, little evidence on effective addressing of regional issues is found in the overall SSN programme design. As the findings from HIES 2005 indicate, in regions with high poverty incidence (Barisal, Rajshahi and Khulna), in terms of percentage of population below the poverty line, percentage of recipient households (HH) is significantly low compared to the poverty rate (Table 12).

Table 12: Regional poverty and beneficiaries of safety net programmes

Division	per cent of recipient HH	per cent of people below poverty line
National	13.06	25.1
Barisal	13.34	35.6
Rajshahi	12.35	34.5
Khulna	9.51	31.6
Sylhet	22.42	20.8
Dhaka	14.33	19.9
Chittagong	11.05	16.1

Source: HIES 2005.

Targeting Assessment through the perception survey

As a target oriented programme, the most important factor defining the success would be the effectiveness of targeting the beneficiaries. The Guideline provided specific criteria of targeting the beneficiaries these are,

1. The programme targets the hardcore poor throughout all 64 districts, including extremely poor unemployed people and marginal farmers, who remain seasonally unemployed in the lean period (5 months), giving emphasis on Char and Haor-baor areas and areas prone to monga, river-bank erosion, flood and other natural disasters.

2. The landless² who have a low income and have no productive assets such as pond for fish culture, and no animal resources.
3. Those eager to work but unemployed and unskilled³ poor person.

Here, targeting is devised on two factors, poverty level and geographical position. Now, there remains a lack of understanding if the term “extremely poor” is not well defined. When objective of the programme is to facilitate the hardcore poor, without a solid clarification of the poverty line, it would not be possible to achieve a fair targeting. On the other side, geographical consideration of the target group seems quite consistent with the programme’s views as it is known that, monga, river erosion, flood prone, haor-baor and char areas are most economically stressed regions in the country.

The guideline also provided eligibility criteria like the beneficiary should be capable to work and be within the age limit of 18 to 50, should be excluded from other SSNs and one person from each family. CPD’s rapid assessment survey revealed that number of family members of most of the beneficiaries was more than 5. According to the HIES (2005), house hold size increases to 4 and above increases the percentage of people living under poverty. Besides, most of them totally lacked productive assets. Though the beneficiaries were excluded from other SSNPs, many of their family members found were to be covered under in other SSNPs. The details of these findings have been presented in Table below.

Table 13: State of the targeting beneficiaries

District	Union (Number of sample)	Family member		Productive assets					Involvement of family members in other SSNP	
		≤4	≥5	No	Percent of beneficiaries depriving any assets	Yes			No	Yes
						Land/house	Livestock	Other		
Nilphamari	Luxmichup (40)	10	30	32	80.0	8	2		33 (82.5%)	7
	Charaikhola (35)	12	23	33	94.2	2			21 (60%)	14
	Kundupukur (20)	7	13	17	85.0	3			15 (75%)	5
Jamalpur	Kulkandi (17)	6	11	15	88.0	2			12 (70%)	5

Source: CPD’s Field Investigation, 2009.

It is observed from Map 1 that Moulovibazar district experienced with low population recoded high number of card distribution. Whereas, in Mymensingh district, with very high population (and also with relative high poverty rate) experienced low distribution of cards. In general, distribution of cards was found to be proportionate to the population density. However, for successful implementation of the programme in the next phase, this sort of loopholes needs to be addressed.

² The landless are considered to own 0.5 acres of land or less than that.

³ Unskilled poor persons mean day labourers or farm labourers who are not trained as masons, carpenters, electricians, gas mechanics or mill workers, or persons who have no alternative employment opportunities. Those who permanently, temporarily or semi-permanently work in a farm or belong to a solvent family are not allowed to register under this programme.

4.3 Time frame

According to the Guideline, the first phase of the programme was to be implemented between September to November 2008. This 3 months duration is a lean period when daily laborers and marginal farmers become unemployed. However, the Guideline assumes that the timing and duration of the lean period is not uniform throughout the country and varies across the country based on the agro-economic characteristics. Traditionally, safety net programmes in Bangladesh were targeted to address concerns during rainy season, natural calamity, drought and flood (Table 14). However, 100-DEGP targeted the entire time period along with the timing of *monga* and *river erosion*.

Table 14: Timing of social safety net programmes

Timing of Programme	Total	Barisal	Chittagong	Dhaka	Khulna	Rajshahi	Sylhet
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Depression	40.46	42.16	38.26	35.14	60.46	50.39	22.29
Rainy Season	18.64	10.94	15.33	28.88	13.01	13.69	7.17
Natural Calamities	30.65	45.85	24.04	28.09	23.72	28.42	52.51
Drought	1.08		2.15	1.1	0.94	0.78	0.97
Flood	8.97	1.05	20.23	7.79	1.88	7.72	17.06

Source: HIES, 2005

Indeed there was a 15 day “adjustment” slot (mentioned in the Guideline) to address necessary variability. In addition, agro-economic characteristics are not the only factor that left the targeting of time period in question, physical suitability of the works/ projects undertaken also posed some difficulties. *Haor* and *Char* areas, two major target areas of the 100 DEGP, remain submerged during that period and definitely that is a time when seasonal unemployment emerges in these areas. The same fact applies for the large flood prone areas of the country. As most of the approved projects were construction or maintenance of rural infrastructures (such as, road (re)construction, canal/ drainage dredging, ground filling, etc.) which involve earth works, these tasks are physically not feasible to be carried out during the adverse weather conditions. As a result, many of the projects in those areas had delayed to start and hence were not completed on time. Consequently, first phase of 60 days did not provide adequate time to complete planned projects in any of the 64 districts. The completion of the programme in terms of duration (days) has been placed in Table 15.

Table 15: Project Completion⁴

Division	No of Approved Projects	No of Started Projects	No of Completed Projects	Completion rate (%)
Dhaka	37917	24687	11950	48.41
Chittagong	31818	22473	9090	40.45
Sylhet	10514	6301	3479	55.21
Khulna	16383	11139	4784	42.95
Barishal	11349	8135	3800	46.71
Rajshahi	45814	28040	17805	63.50
Total	153795	100775	50908	50.52

Source: GoB 2009

Field observations revealed that in *Choraikhola* and *Kundupukur* Union of Sadar Upazilla of Nilphamari, the programme ran only for 44 and 39 days, respectively. But according to the official records kept in the UNO office, payment has been made for 51 days. Similar situation was found in

⁴ Source: The number of projects retrieved from: <http://www.mofdm.gov.bd/100%20Day%20Employment%20Generation%20Program.htm>

Jamalpur, where officially the programme was recorded to run for 50 days, whereas field observations suggested 44 days.

4.4 Selection Procedure

Selection of projects: The list of works that were to be undertaken during the lean period was finalised by the end of August 2008, and 1,48,228 projects were approved. The MoFDM along with the Programme Steering Committee (PSC), decided on the type of work that should be considered for this programme. Priority projects have been mentioned in earlier section. It is to be noted that the range of works envisaged in the 100-DEGP is consistent with the strategic provisions on agricultural development in the National Food Policy (NFP), which emphasise on investing in rural infrastructure. Instructed by the relevant authorities and based on consultations with stakeholders, the UP went on to proposing a list of projects to the Union Parishad Disaster Management Committee (UPDMC). This committee made recommendations on the list of projects which was to be approved by the UNO. The UPDMC published the list of approved projects.

In practice, the selection of project sites and works was not done very carefully. Only in some cases, works were selected in consultation with relevant local experts such as the Department of Agriculture and Water Development Board officials. In fact, one observation that arose from the indepth qualitative assessment carried out by CPD was that collaborating with experienced project implementers helped to ensure success of the programme in terms of its effectiveness. Overall, the selection process was done on an ad hoc basis and not as part of an integrated local development planning, as is the practice in India, for instance. Under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in India, an annual village plan is drawn by each Gram Panchayat in consultation with Gram Sabhas, which is then consolidated and approved at the district level.

Selection of beneficiaries and card distribution: Interviews with district, upazila and union level government officials revealed that the official criteria for selection of beneficiaries had not always been clearly understood and in some cases, were not even known. Yet, overall, we found that the selection criteria of poverty, age and exclusion from other safety net programmes were mentioned in the Guideline.

Allocation of cards per ward: The basis on which UNOs decided on the number of cards for allocation in each ward varied widely. While the official criteria were poverty and unemployment intensity, the CPD study team found that at times decisions were based solely on the number of people in one area, and not the poverty intensity based on the notion arguing that poverty was pervasive in all areas.

Although Guideline of the programme mentioned about the involvement of a number of people and consultations with relevant individuals, in reality the UP Chairman or members in several cases did not consult anyone else in deciding on as to who should be on the list. Although a union level supervising officer was made responsible to review and check the list the person had little authority to challenge the choices that had been made by the UP Chairmen and Members.

Incorporating NGOs involvement: The Guideline also refers to the NGO involvement in the selection process of beneficiaries and works. However, such interface between the government and NGO/private sector of the country has not been followed.

Following age limit: As national identity card was used as the main identity confirmation document, almost every beneficiary had to get enlisted and receive the registration card in their respective districts. The age level instructed by the Guideline was not strictly followed. Many of the beneficiaries were of the age around 55 to 60 years (both male and female) and capable of working efficiently.

Mismanagement in selection procedure: In Nilphamari, Jamalpur and Narayanganj, list of beneficiaries were prepared by the Chairman or members of the UP. Local authorities responsible for providing cards reported that those who did not own any land and who were not included in any other SSNPs were selected for the 100-DEGP. As allocation may not sufficient, all poor could not be included in the programme and thus the authorities were blamed for being biased. The providers notified that employment for everyone is not possible now due to resource constraint.

However rules were not followed in all incidences. It was found in the field visits that many of the beneficiaries possessed productive assets including land and livestock, and conversely, many landless poor were not enlisted for the programme. A male beneficiary in one of the unions reported the CPD study team that, a school teacher who owns land or other assets was a beneficiary of the programme⁵.

Lack of card issued against large number of poor: In Jamalpur, on the other hand, the selection procedure was found more or less well organized and transparent, and the beneficiaries also expressed satisfactions with the programme. The Chairman of *Kulkandi* union of *Dewanganj* in Jamalpur complained that compared to the population and the poverty level of the union the allocation of employment was not sufficient. This made the task of selection of beneficiaries difficult and demanded lot of prudence. Moreover, as the wage rate is not very high, capable labourers were not interested to work in this scheme. So in many cases, the providers had to find physically disabled or incapable persons to get enlisted in the programme.

Overall, observations in Nilphamari, Jamalpur and Narayanganj revealed that the scheme was effective in targeting young female house-wives who came from low income and poor families who did not have any assets and did not have much opportunity to even earn a subsistence living.

Influence of personal ties and political factors: The selection procedure has been doubted by many and complaints of bribery against the Chairman and members of the UP were not unusual. In the field, many eligible persons were found to be excluded from the programme, list which was reported due to the inability of the prospective beneficiaries to pay the local decision makers. Many of them reported that this is because they have failed to pay bribes in order to get enlisted.

Box 1: Corruption

Case I. Pay first to get the card

In the days of hardship, when *Renubala* (35) was struggling to feed her 4 children and drug-addicted unemployed husband, she was delighted to hear that she was selected as a participant in the 100-DEGP of the government. But fortune turns to fade away this time too. The UP Member came up demanding Tk. 1000 to get her enlisted on the programme. Earning a meal for the family itself was a daunting task for her. Managing this additional money was a nightmare, from where would she manage the money? The member demanded that, she would be working for 100 days earning Tk 10,000 and hence it would not be so hard to pay Tk 1000. Desperate for the job, *Renubala* bargained and finally settled at Tk 400 to get enlisted on the programme. This has been a common practice in the Luxmichup Union of Nilphamari Sadar Upazilla. Many of the beneficiaries had to pay Tk 200 to Tk 500 each for registration in the programme. The programme ran for 51 days on an average in the first phase. So, ultimately the beneficiaries failed to derive their expected benefits.

Case II. Mismatched records of work-days

The official Guideline of the 100-DEGP was designed to be carried out in two phases where the first phase was to take place between September and November generating 60 work-days. Lack of preparation led to the delayed commencement of the programme, and on the other hand, because of the upcoming Boro season, the programme had to be completed at an earlier date. As a result, on an average, 50 work-days were created according to the official achievement record. However, group discussions with the beneficiaries revealed that in Kundupukur of Nilphamari, the programme continued only for 44 work-days. In various wards of the union, 39 to 47 work-days were generated on an average. So, where did the extra work-days come from? Certainly there were some adjustments in the muster rolls. Faking of 5 work-days for each worker can produce large amount of leakage when the livelihood of the extreme poor is considered.

Once the number of cards per ward was decided the UP members used their own judgment to select individuals for the programme. Interviews by the CPD study team revealed a preference towards known people. This is confirmed by the information collected from the field information which shows that being a close or distant relative of the UP Chairman significantly increased the chances of being a participant and that people who felt they could seek assistance from the UP members were also more likely to be beneficiaries.

⁵ The person has requested to remain anonymous.

Another factor which was reported to have influenced the selection process was the upcoming UP election. Reportedly, in a number of cases the 100-DEGP was used as a campaign tool to strengthen the vote base of some candidates.

In spite of all these external factors influencing the process of the beneficiary selection, the effectiveness of the targeting turned out to be satisfactory. The government tried to keep track of the irregularities observed in the programme which has been placed in Table 16.

Table 16: Written or published (in newspapers) complains and actions taken

Issue	Number
Complains published in newspapers	77
Editorial/features	5
Complained by various individuals	24
Total complains	101
Letters sent to DC for investigation	95
Reports received from DCs till date	34
Complains proved	11
Complains remained unproved	23
Reports not received from DCs till date	67
Over-phone orders from the Ministry to solve complains which were published in newspapers	03
Among the total complains	53 specific projects; 43 non-specific complains
Amount of money notified in the complains	Tk 1298960
Allocation in those districts	1250280000
Percentage of involvement of money among the complains	0.104%

Source: GoB 2009.

Table 17: Mismanagement regarding issuing card

District	Union	Card issued		Bribery for getting enlisted			
		Yes	No	No	Yes		
					<Tk 100	Tk 100-500	>Tk 500
Nilphamari	Luxmichup (40)	40		29		7	4
	Charaikhola (35)	35		26		8	1
	Kundupukur (20)	20		11		7	2
Jamalpur	Kulkandi (17)		17	15		2	

Source: CPD's Field Investigation 2009.

* in Kulkandi union of Jamalpur, wages were paid weekly in few cases.

Corruption in issuing card: Registration cards for the beneficiaries were delivered in all the unions except for Jamalpur. However, many of them accused the providers (chairman, member) for demanding illegal cash payment to get enlisted. In Luxmichup union, amount of bribery ranged from Tk. 100 to Tk. 500 per person. In Charaikhola and Kundupukur of Nilphamari, cases were found where more than Tk.500 was demanded. This type of irregularities implies that there have been incidences of leakage of funds which is not negligible. For example, in Luxmichup union such leakage amounted to about 16 per cent total allocation⁶.

Beneficiaries were paid Tk. 100 daily in all the study areas except in Jamalpur where sometimes weekly payments were made. The Chairman of the Kulkandi union of Islampur, Jamalpur replied that allocation from the government was not provided regularly. They have tried to manage the daily payment with cash from their own payment but that was not always possible.

⁶ Leakage amount = No. of beneficiaries X (official work day – actual work-day) X wage rate

Table 18: Types of Irregularity observed

Irregularity Allegation	Description
Selection and implementation of projects/ works	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selection procedure often carried out without consultation with relevant stakeholders. Selection of projects was not made in a participatory or bottom-up approach. • The implemented projects were not producing social benefits. The selected projects involved ground filling or road constructions of providers' (i.e. UP chairmen, members, etc.) own properties. • Ownership of resources created through the 100-DEGP was not given to the beneficiaries of the programme. For example, the compost fertilizer produced was used by the providers for their own agricultural purpose. • Often the projects carried out were taken in subcontract. For an instance, the providers came into contract with an affluent person of the area who needed ground filling of his own residence. Recruiting workers from the 100 DEGP through the providers would substantially reduce his construction cost, a portion of which he can pay them (providers) in return, deriving benefit for the both.
Selection of beneficiaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selection procedure often carried out without consultation with relevant stakeholders. • Bribery was a frequent case during the enlisting of beneficiaries. The providers demand that each beneficiary would earn Tk. 10,000 for the guaranteed 100 work-days. So, paying Tk. 500 or Tk. 1000 per head would not be very difficult. • Providers' nepotism led to mis-targeting of beneficiaries, giving selection to ineligible persons (i.e., non-poor, beneficiaries of other SSNPs, employed, owner of productive assets, etc.).
Forgery with workers' replacement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Guideline allows the replacement of an absent worker by his/ her family member. However, the providers did not permit that creating spaces for leakage. The gaps were replaced by fake or non-listed workers and the payments were captured by the providers and their associates.
Illegal relocation of workers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Portion of workers were relocated to work for the providers own purpose (house holds or crop field). This deficit of laborers at the worksite led to the incomplete status of many projects.
Faking/ adjustments in muster rolls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adjusted muster rolls presented illegally increased number of work-days. As release of fund for payment depends on the number of work-days recorded in the muster, the fake work-days transferred a significant amount of resources into the pockets of the providers.
Grievance checking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whenever the beneficiaries complained to the higher authority about the adjustment in muster rolls or other corruption, chairmen or members tried to settle the issues by bribing the complainers. Cases were found, where complains of adjusting 10 work-days were settled by paying for 5 work-days, leaving the rest in their own pocket.
Hindering monitoring procedure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chairmen or members invited the tag officer or other monitoring officers at their own home, distracting them from the work sites.

Source: CPD's Field Investigation 2009.

Female participation: In some cases, it was felt by the Ward members that women did not have the physical capacity to perform the types of works offered by the programme, thus left them out of the selection process. On a number of occasions, female workers have to perform critical task like cleaning ponds. In more conservative areas, women denied to work alongside men. In some cases, women braved the cultural norm and were faced with great criticism for daring to want to join such a programme where they would have to work outside, with men, and with their heads uncovered.

Other factors restricting women's participation were the lack of transportation to the work site which was sometimes far, the absence of toilets, safe drinking water and food. All these made it difficult for women with small children in particular to join in this programme. Besides women have to carry their own instruments while performing their works which often they failed to purchase by themselves and borrowed from the neighbors.

In spite of these constraints and without any gender target in the programme, 19.5 per cent⁷ of the beneficiaries in the first phase of the 100-DEGP turned out to be women which implies that this is a strong demand by women for participating in such a programme. This also reflects the desperation among women for work. Indeed, only out of desperation would a Bangladeshi rural woman be willing to work with men at onerous, low-paying manual work labor (IFPRI 2007). The Indian Employment Guarantee Scheme requires that one third of the participants be women. The degree of participation in the 100-DEGP by Bangladeshi women is marginally higher than national labour force participation by women which is 18 per cent according to the Labour Force Survey 2005 (BBS 2008).

Because certain socio-cultural norms seem to have gotten in the way of women joining the programme in more conservative areas, reservation of some works exclusively for women may be considered to encourage female participation. For those women who do not work outside their homes, particularly in the field, gathered work experience not only outside their house but also with their counterparts. 100-DEGP provided them an employment opportunity for the first time in their lives.

4.5 Fund release mechanism and implementation

Allocation and disbursement of a fund worth Tk. 20,000 million in such a programme is problematic. To tackle this situation the government had to rely on existing mechanisms used in other safety net programmes such as Cash for Work. The Guideline provides a certain mechanism of fund release which involves officials in three different levels. First, the General Accounts Officer (AO) in the MoFDM release an order to the Upazila Accounts Officer via the District Accounts Officer (and DC) to release a cheque in the name of the UNO and the Project Implementation Officer (PIO) who can encash it by depositing it at any government scheduled bank in a new account jointly held by them. The Union Project Implementation Committee requests for cash for projects to the upazila PIO. The upazila Project Implementation Officer verifies these cash requisitions and then recommends to the UNO for payment. Each Project Implementation Committee (PIC) gets a cheque from the UNO and PIO. The Chairman of the PIC then disburses the money to the labourers through the muster payroll which is checked by a 'tag officer'. Each beneficiary signs a form on receipt of the money. This same form is signed by six different officials including the tag officer, the PIO and the UNO.

Since each tag officer is responsible for all the projects under one union it is physically impossible for the officer to be present during the daily payment of all works (as all works are likely to end towards the same time of the day). Thus the Guideline is not compatible with the requirements of the programme.

Administrative cost uniform: The issue of a flat rate of administrative costs for all upazilas was questioned as some areas have to manage larger number of beneficiaries and projects than others. An amount of Tk. 100 million out of the overall Tk. 20,000 million (0.5per cent) have been allocated for administrative and logistic costs. For the Programme Director's office an amount of Tk. 11.5 million was allocated which was 11.5 per cent of the total administrative costs. Moreover, all 64 districts received Tk. 50,000 each (3 per cent), 480 upazilas Tk. 60,000 (29 per cent) each and all 4,474 unions received Tk. 12,000 each (54 per cent).

Wage payment: As per the Guideline, the daily a wage of Tk 100 has to be paid to each worker on a daily basis. Therefore, even if fund release was delayed, payment was made to labourers in some areas. For example, in Jamalpur the chairman mentioned that the PIC managed to clear the payment daily from their own savings.

It was suggested by many at the field level that that the amount paid daily is not enough to buy food for a 5 to 6 member family in the days of rocketing food price. The wage should have been increased to Tk. 150 per day.

Since the system tries to minimise the opportunities for misuse of funds, the transaction costs involved are substantial. In particular, the fact that every payment requires a form to be signed by six officials indicates a high transaction cost (1.2 billion signatures over the life of the programme just for the payment to the beneficiaries). The Steering Committee's attention was drawn to this problem but it was decided not to change the system for the time being, for fear of misuse of funds. Lack of financial

⁷ First Phase Completion Report; January 2009, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management.

and human resources made this administrative load heavier. As a result, payments were made often on weekly or even bi-weekly basis. The need for adequate level of human resources, particularly at the Upazila and Union levels, was felt by the officials concerned at the field level.

Table 19: Comparison between the market wage and programme wage rate

District	Union	Card issued		Bribery for getting cards			Payment frequency			
		yes	No	No	Yes		Daily	Weekly	others	
					<100	100-500				>500
Nilphamari	Luxmichup (40)	40		29		7	4	40		
	Charaikhola (35)	35		26		8	1	35		
	Kundupukur (20)	20		11		7	2	20		
Jamalpur	Kulkandi (17)		17	15		2		17*		

Source: CPD's Field Investigation 2009.

Market wage rate vis-à-vis 100 days wage rate: During the lean periods the average wage rate of male beneficiaries in the Nilphamari district ranged between Tk 50 to 80 per day. In the peak season of agricultural activities, daily wage rate for male may reach as high as Tk. 200 or even more. On the contrary, for the female laborers, wages were rather low, less than Tk. 50 per day during in both seasons. Since females were mainly involved in house works, in most of the cases the payment was made in kind, for example, in form of meals). In Jamalpur district, the average wage for men was above Tk. 80 per day, in the lean seasons. In peak seasons, when crops were planted or harvested, daily wage rate was usually higher, ranging from Tk 100 to 200 for males and around 100 for females.

Mode of receiving money by the beneficiaries: Another important finding was that a large number of beneficiaries did not require to put their signatures or fingerprints on any record book at the time of payment, which left leaving much scope for misallocation of funds. The fact that many beneficiaries reported of not having a participant card tends to support the aforesaid claim. In effect, it was found that the number of names in the muster roll book was often higher than that of the number of workers actually present at the project site. In the five areas studied by the CPD researchers, an average of 10 per cent of the labourers on the muster roll either did not exist or were unaware that their names were on the list.

This calls for a more efficient system of payment to labourers to be in place in order to reduce leakages or resources. The daily payment of wages has turned out to be a difficult task in many areas, and should therefore be reviewed. In this regard, the option for a weekly payment, as is practiced in the Indian programme, may be thought of.

4.6 Keeping records and monitoring

The PIC has to have an important role in maintaining the muster roll and acknowledgements of the receipt of the money as labour wage under the project. Upon completion of the project, the PIC has to send a report along with the implemented muster roll bills and voucher to the upazila PIC within fifteen days of the completion of the project for audit purposes. At the upazila level, the upazila Disaster Management Committee (DMC) is responsible to monitor the implementation of the programme and to send monthly progress reports to the DC and the Ministry. The UNO has to appoint a tag officer whose role is to monitor the works of one union with the help of the PIC. The District Relief and Rehabilitation Officer (DRRO) has to send a consolidated monthly project progress report of all the upazilas under the district to the MoFDM. Besides, DRRO supervises programmes/projects under the district and sends final report of the projects to the concerned cell of the MoFDM within the scheduled date. Concurrently, at the district level, the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) prepares a permanent evaluation and monitoring system: projects under this programme are to be recommended for implementation to the upazila committee after monitoring and evaluation, each month of a year. The DDMC has to examine the progress of all projects under the programme and has to arrange for these to be implemented. This Committee is also supposed to prepare a monthly

report of the activities related to the implementation of programmes and send them to the Steering Committee along with suggestions.

At the Ministry, a Joint Secretary of the MoFDM is responsible for monitoring the programme, and the Steering Committee is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the monitoring takes place. It is obvious from the above that the design of the 100-DEGP involves a large number of actors at various phases which makes the task quite complicated and difficult.

This complexity in the design may be partly explained by the government's cautious steps inclination to establish checks and balances in the whole mechanism of the 100-DEGP in order to ensure a transparent and accountable system. At times, this may have translated into a burdened procedure with operational difficulties which led the implementing authorities at the field level to adapt to the ground realities instead of sticking to the Guidelines.

Field observations revealed that the formulated mechanism according to the Guideline made the situation too cumbersome. Preparing and maintaining daily achievement reports were found to be daunting and stressful tasks. Involvement of so many officials also seems to be confusing. In addition, several cases were found where clear instructions were not conveyed about the official method of monitoring at the union levels.

Beneficiaries complained that responsible officers did not visit worksites on a regular basis. Complaints were also raised against the Tag officers that they spent more time enjoying the hospitality of the UP Chairmen and members, rather than monitoring worksites. According to the Guideline, NGOs should be involved in the monitoring process, which did not happen in reality.

Box 2: Local authorities' perception about the effectiveness of 100-DEGP

The UP Chairman of Kulkandi Union, Jamalpur Mr. Jalal complained that the time given to design and plan for the programme was quite insufficient. On August 15th 2008 they were instructed that they had to prepare the list of beneficiaries and projects by the end of the month. Few days before the deadline, the time period was shortened all of a sudden leaving the providers in the middle of no where. Moreover, orders came to reduce the number of beneficiaries. Mr Jalal reported that as they had to downsize the beneficiaries list, complains were raised that the Chairmen and members had forged the list and looking for loopholes to earn illegal money. Meanwhile, as not all hardcore poor could be brought under the net, the non beneficiaries who were not enlisted spread rumors against the providers. Lack of preparation for the programme also resulted in failure to achieve the desired outcome of the programme.

Providers from other areas also complained such misunderstandings. Government officials from the UNO and the DC office pointed out some loopholes of the programme which need to be addressed to strengthen the upcoming phases. Targeting of beneficiaries needs to be more accurate and well organized. Project selection also needs to be more participatory. A massive awareness drive needs to be made. The UP Chairmen and members demanded more time to prepare for the programme.

Another problem from the providers' perspective is that, this programme is handed over as an extra responsibility upon the providers. The allocated administrative cost is quite low and irregular. As a result, often they have to pay from their own pocket.

Table 20: Summary of field observations according to the 100-DEGP's Guideline

Guideline Points	Districts/ Unions			Jamalpur	Narayanganj
	Nilphamari Luxmichup	Charaikhola	Kundupukur	Kulkandi	Sadar
Enrollment of Phase-I within targeted time (Sep to Nov 2008)	√	√	√	√	√
Completion of 60 work-days in the 1st phase	X	X	X	X	X
Provision of technical assistance	X	X	X	X	X
Selection of one beneficiary from each family	√	√	√	√	√
Involvement of 100DEGP	X*	X*	X*	X*	X*

beneficiaries in other SSNPs.					
Involvement of stakeholders (as per the instructions of the guideline) in the selection procedure	X	X	X	X	X
Open declaration/ public disclosure of selection lists	X	X	X	X	X
Complete distribution of cards in due time	√	√	√	X	X
Wage payment of Tk.100 per person per day	√	√	√	√	√
Daily payment of wage	√	√	√	X**	√
Employment of laborers in their own district	√	√	√	√	√
Formation of all committees	X	X	X	X	X
Monitoring by government officials	√	X	X	√	√

Source: CPD's Field Investigation 2009.

Note * very few beneficiaries are involved in other SSNPs such as VGD, VGF, TR and FFW.

** in Kulkandi union of Jamalpur, wages were paid weekly in few cases.

Box 3: Silver lining in the monga prone districts

Against many dark patches of the 100DEGP, the monga prone area of the northern Bangladesh - one of the key target areas of the programme – reveals a success story of the programme. In Nilphamari, a monga stressed district, majority of the hardcore poor either migrate to other urban centres for a job or turn out to be seasonal beggars to feed the family in the lean period of the year. The scenario had changed this year. *Mr. Shukhdhon* from Luxmichup of Nilphamari Sadar, participated in the 100DEGP and did not migrate. His daily wage of Tk. 100 was not much, but at least it secured him and his family 3 meals a day in those days. Beneficiaries also reported that the programme had not helped them to produce any productive assets, but what they have got was really necessary to survive at that crisis moment of unemployment and high prices of food and essential commodities.

The beneficiaries urged that this programme should continue in the coming years and throughout the whole year.

Section V _____

Loopholes in the Programme

In Bangladesh, this programme is the first endeavor in addressing the issue of social protection for ultra poor section of the society through guaranteed employment generation. Both in view of the newness and scale of the programme, a hundred per cent success in all cases cannot be expected. The first phase of the programme was completed in November 2008 leaving a trail of mixed reactions among the stakeholders. CPD's field experience reveals that despite many drawbacks, the programme certainly has had an impact on the vulnerable hardcore poor in terms of containing starvation. Now that the government is planning to implement the second phase of the 100-DEGP, experience of the first phase will be pertinent for consideration in achieving more success in the upcoming phase. During the field investigation by the CPD team, a number of loopholes were observed which may be considered for elimination during the next implementation phase of the programme.

The loopholes can be categorized in following manner:

a. Institutional:

- One of the major institutional loopholes is that the legal basis of the programme is not based on an Act, as it is for the NREGA in India.
- The guideline does not clearly define the formation procedure of various committees.

b. Procedural:

- Selection procedure of the beneficiaries remained undisclosed to the public.
- Providers' nepotistic attitudes played a major role in the mis-targeting of beneficiaries.
- Project selection was not always driven by local demand.
- Guideline language was not concrete and often ambiguous in its content

c. Designing:

- Time for the planning stage of the programme was not sufficient
- The given time frame does not necessarily reflect the crisis period uniformly for the whole country. This should depend on the socio-economic and agro-economic perspective of each respective area
- The wage rate has been fixed at Tk. 100 per day. In industrial regions, average market wage rate is higher than Tk 100, which resulted in lack of interest of the laborers for this programme.
- While designing projects, time required to complete them was not estimated accurately

d. Targeting and selection:

- Beneficiaries are not always well targeted. Selections from non-target groups are frequent and incidents of nepotistic behaviour by the providers or selectors were part of the many complaints of the respondents
- Targeting the number of beneficiaries should not consider the population of a particular area; rather, the number of poor should be emphasized. Poverty mapping should be conducted with efficacy
- NGOs involved in poverty eradication at local levels were not consulted during selection of beneficiaries and target groups

- Upper age group was limited to 50 and no quota for female participation
- e. Implementing:
- Actual number of working days does not match with the official records
 - The 60 work-days of the first phase were not completed. In most of the unions, the programme ran for around 50 days
 - Quality of the work is unsatisfactory. In addition, most of the projects that were initiated remain incomplete
 - Distribution of registration cards was not well prepared since in some places, cards were not distributed on time
- f. Monitoring:
- Absent of integrated and clear monitoring process since agents were not legally obliged to visit worksites regularly both during the time of selection and implementation
 - NGOs were not involved in the monitoring procedure

Box 4: Leakages in the safety net

It is inherent in the nature of such transfer programmes, located within unequal societies, and serviced by unaccountable governments, that leakages remain high due to theft, corruption and system loss. Studies of the FFWP report that 30 per cent of the foodgrains did not reach the intended beneficiaries. In contrast, cash transfers under the Road Maintenance Programme or the educational stipends are more likely to reach the intended beneficiaries. However, these programmes also tend to be prone to corruption, where officials and elected representatives enjoy opportunities to extract rents. Field surveys carried out for this report, indicate that leakages for the programmes for Old Age Allowance, Allowance for Widows and for VGD, are in the range of 5 to 10 per cent. The report identifies that the elected Union Parishad Chairman or some parishad member, extracted rents from prospective beneficiaries as a precondition for certifying a particular person as a beneficiary. It would appear that local elected representatives have superseded the local officials in the control and distribution of official patronage. However, the Union Council Chairman and members, who have some political identity, need to collude with local officials in order to extract their share of the spoils from public expenditure.

Where resources are limited and potential beneficiaries are many, who actually becomes a beneficiary of a transfer payment, becomes a matter of selection. In an ideal system some form of democratic consultation or an objective criteria for selection could have been deployed. In the case of Bangladesh, the choice becomes a matter of discretion on the part of local decision makers who could pick and choose from many resource poor households who were seeking some form of work or relief. Our survey data and other empirical work have established that this discretion was frequently exercised on the basis of payment of a bribe or extraction of political rent in the form of support in electoral contests or other forms of local factional contestation. Some of the reasons for exclusion from the VGD or Old Age Allowance or Widow's Allowance programme cited in the survey were:

- Not having a good relationship with a relative of the UP Chairman/member
- Not being a member of the vote bank of the UP Chairman/member
- Did not bribe UP Chairman/Member
- Did not know reasons for exclusion
- Nobody advocated their case.

For those who were enrolled as beneficiaries, a mirror image of the rationale given above, was offered.

Table 21: In-built mechanism to address loopholes of 100-DEGP and NREGA

Loopholes	Interventions from other country experiences	Recommendations for BD
Target area: <i>Wide selection of areas without piloting</i>	The 100DEGP emphasized some special regions like Monga, Char, Haor-Baor, and river erosion etc, but the programme started simultaneously in all 64 districts. In India, NREGA was launched in a phased-in approach – gradually increasing the coverage area.	A phase-in approach offers enough policy space to address limitations, to overcome them and to strengthen the future development of the programme.
Time period: <i>Bound to limited phase.</i>	The 100 DEGP was planned to be carried out in two phases (September to November and March to April), targeting the two lean periods. However, the lean period is not compatible with the framed period across the whole country. Flooding, seasonal pattern and agro-economic conditions are major factors determining the time frame. In NREGA, the programme generates employment for 100 days throughout the whole year, leaving room to tackle any crisis period at local levels.	The time period can be made demand-driven and may be kept as unbound.
Working days per week: <i>Need to be tailor-made.</i>	The 100 DEGP in most of the districts in Bangladesh was carried out 5 days a week which left 2 days of no income. In NREGA, the programmes mostly operated in six days a week. Often the beneficiaries are informed about the duration of the programmes including the week days.	Work can be continued for six days instead of current five days. It has been observed in some occasions in some places that, work was continued for seven days a week. But this scenario was not very frequent with other places.
Targeting Gender: <i>Lack of Target</i>	The 100DEGP instructs no special contribution from gender perspective. On contrary, NREGA confirms participation of one third portions of women among the workers which made the women empowered and increases their mobility.	Like NREGA, participation of one third segments of the women needs to be ensured.
Age group: <i>Scope for manipulation and elderly qualified people making unemployed.</i>	NREGA allows workers to participate who are above 18 years. In Bangladesh, age limit has been set between 18 to 50. Another issue is old age allowance which is provided for elderly aged above 65. This reveals that, the people in age group 50 to 65 are officially not included in the two SSNs. It has been observed that the success of NREGA facilitates through participation by the both elderly people and the women.	Success of the NREGA is highly influenced by the participation of aged people. Young are energetic enough to find alternative jobs, but an elderly has limited opportunities.
NGOs limited role: <i>Lack of transparency</i>		Local NGOs, working at grass root levels and dealing with poverty stressed people, could use their expertise in the selection and identification process of the beneficiaries. This will ultimately fertilise the bottom-up process of this programme.

<p>Selection of works: <i>Without any panning and more of a top-down approach</i></p>	<p>In NREGA, selection of works is done through a bottom-up or participatory approach. Annual project plans are prepared for each village by the "Gram Panchayet". EGP works are selected from that plan.</p> <p>In the 100DEGS in Bangladesh, though the guideline provides an essence of participatory selection, but in reality, the selection process remained top-down.</p> <p>After the official declaration of the programme in 15 August, 2008, the stakeholders had only half a month on hand to prepare and plan for the colossal programme as the Guideline instructs to commence the programme within September.</p> <p>NREGA, in its earlier phases, also suffered from lack of preparedness.</p>	<p>Work Selection process needs to be participatory. Provision of technical assistance needs to be placed while selecting projects. Additional responsibility need tro be placed while selecting projects either to new tag officer or others.</p> <p>Exploring to tag the programmes with the LGED, needs to be done.</p>
<p>Selection of work sites: <i>Lack of coordination among the authorities</i></p>	<p>In India the work programme initiated in a coordinated manner comprising the relevant ministries. Though the 100DEGP had some provisions in the context of coordination and selection, it had failed to make an impact in the field.</p>	<p>The programme in the next phase needs to take care of this provision.</p>
<p>Performing the work: <i>Lack of technical assistance</i></p>	<p>The issue of TA remained unclear in the guideline. Even the providers don't know much about this issue. NREGA in India and TRABAZAR in Argentina train up workers and providers and provide sufficient technical assistance to carry out a project with efficacy.</p>	<p>For any technical work, laborers must be provided with minimum training, which additionally provides development of his/her physical capital.</p>
<p>Organizing the Work: <i>Lack of Institutional setup</i></p>	<p>The 100DEGP is not an act. We do not have also the "right to information" act. On the other hand, programme in India is stated by the Act.</p>	<p>Government could think to initiate this sort of act in order to make the programme mandatory and more legitimate.</p>
<p>Employment generation vs employment guarantee: <i>Lack of any Guarantee provision</i></p>	<p>In NREGA, job to be provided by Gram Panchayat within 15 days from application receipt date, as stated by the Act.</p> <p>In Bangladesh job are to be provided within 15 days of registration/issue of card, but there is no legal guarantee</p>	<p>Government could consider initiating this sort of act to make the programme not only transparent, but also accountable and credible.</p>

<p>Guideline: <i>Ambiguous and Cumbersome</i></p>	<p>The instruction Guidelines provided by the Government is not very clear. Several instructions are provided with phrases like “may” and “should”, which creates gray areas in the instructions.</p>	<p>Clearly instructed guideline is a pre-requisite for any programme if it is to operate effectively.</p>
<p>Corruption: <i>Nearly at all levels</i></p>	<p>NREGA is backed by Act which ensures that rapid action can be taken against any practices related to corruption.</p> <p>One of the major places of corruption is the payment system. A number of ways, such as fake and adjusted muster rolls, fake workers, etc, were adopted to steal money.</p> <p>A big break through against corruption is the collective voice of the workers. In Madhya Pradesh, such movements have guaranteed workers’ right to get unemployment allowance</p>	<p>An Act must be incorporated by the Government to form the legal basis of the 100DEGP.</p> <p>Payment system can be reformed by introducing bank or post-offices as separate payment agencies. This system also provides the workers, especially women, a control over their earnings.</p> <p>Workers own Samity types self motivated group like India can be introduced among the beneficiaries. This collective action could not only act as an agent for ensuring accountability but also can improve the quality of works.</p> <p>Introduction of MIS: 100DEG can introduce MIS system for putting beneficiaries’ information in a transparent manner. The selection process and results can also be published through this. The village call system (like Palli Tattha) can facilitate this process.</p> <p>The registration card could be redesigned. The back of the card might include 100 rows in several columns, where the beneficiaries can out their sign while they out their sign in the master roll. The card could also include the helpline number where they can get information or out their complaints.</p>
<p>Card issuance: <i>To card or to discard</i></p>	<p>Both 100DEGP and NREGA failed to complete card distribution and maintenance. But NREGA in a number of states adopted a number of innovative ways to tackle problems related to issuing card and its use.</p> <p>NREGA was recommended to push a registration drive to complete card distribution.</p> <p>In Maharashtra, signature in the card facilitates to make the card and wage distribution a more transparent way. Literacy appeared to be important to fight against corruption. First, literate persons know their rights and it’s not easy to deceive them. Second, thumb expressions are easily faked than signature of a literate person.</p>	<p>Like NREGA, Bangladesh also requires such effort along with some reformations in the card design.</p> <p>The card should be more user friendly</p> <p>There should be help lines provided in the card</p> <p>In the card, there should be system that, when the cardholder gets a payment the related authority have to sign on the card against the payment. This cross matching can enhance transparency and to a larger degree of accountability.</p>

		As a structural prerequisite, literacy rate needs to be enhanced in the country.
Involvement of Political Party: <i>political will and party participation.</i>	In NREGA, political parties compete with each other to take the programme to their respective areas and use it as a 'vote-bank'. This competition has also intensified the Lok Sabha elections.	The 100DEGP programme could achieve a highly success rate if the political government supports the programme. The ultra poor people have strong sympathy for this programme as this is the only hope and scope for them in the lean periods. If the political government or parties carry out the programme seriously, their vote bank could increase in the next national or upazilla elections. Involvement of political parties, depending on the extent may increase the success rate of the programme.
Low Productivity: <i>Lack of motivations</i>	People often take the 100DEGP as a government relief programme. As a result they do not work efficiently which ultimately hampers the desired progress. NREGA was recommended to introduce piece-rate wage system in order to motivate the workers to earn their extra hours.	The government could consider introducing piece-rate wage system. At the least the actual plan of the work needs to be placed before the workers.
Quality of works: <i>Not yet fully accepted</i>	The quality of the work conducted under the programme was not satisfactory. The NREGA in Uttar Pradesh also faced the similar problems. This is mainly due to inadequate planning, lack of technical staff and poor supervision.	The programme design in Bangladesh did not take into account the quality of work. The whole programme needs to be holistic in nature in comprising both the employment generation and developmental work
Awareness of the programme: <i>Lack of idea on the issues of Public asset creation</i>	The programme should incorporate works which creates assets for the society. In Himachal Pradesh of India, work types were diversified rather than the traditional works such as construction or repairing of gabions, irrigation canals, step walls, burial grounds, play grounds, boundary walls for schools, etc.	Diversification of works required to create assets for the society.
Awareness of people: <i>Lack of coordinated efforts</i>	The lack of time for planning and preparation of the programme has led to substantial deficit in mass awareness. Almost none of the beneficiaries had any idea about the programme. NREGA also lacked mass awareness among the stakeholders during its initial stage. Later on both print and electronic media along with the NGOs assisted to inform people aware of the programme.	The VGD programme in Bangladesh used posters to create awareness. For the 100DEGP, similar activities can be initiated. Media can also play a very important role. In NREGA, booklets, pamphlets, videos, simplified guidelines were suggested for awareness building. Like NREGA, Rojgar Divash typed day in a week can be introduced where beneficiaries and providers will gather to share thoughts, ideas and complains.

Success of the programme: some positive aspects

- The programme has been highly appreciated by the beneficiaries.
- Local administrations in some places proved to be capable of handling such large programmes.
- Women's economic independence had been warranted in some places.
- Empowerment of elderly has been promoted.
- Wages were paid regularly at the guaranteed rate.
- High success rate in some areas reveal that positive interest of the local authority in 100-DEGP can enhance the poverty alleviation process.
- Monga had less effect as a result of the programme.
- Urban-ward migration of the unemployed poor has declined.
- The first two objectives of the programme (Employment generation for the extremely poor unemployed people, and to increase the purchasing power of the hardcore poor who are stressed due to price hike) were fulfilled in most of the cases.
- During lean periods, especially in the monga prone districts, the repercussion of such a calamity was tolerable.
- Projects such as pond digging, embankment maintenance, construction of roads, production of compost fertilizer, ground filling of various institutions have enhanced local assets owned by the poor.

The success of the programme is reflected through the responses of the beneficiaries to some extent. As is observed in Table 22, 90 per cent of the beneficiaries want the programme to be continued.

Table 22: Overview of the programme from the beneficiaries' perspective

District	Upazilla and Union	No Sample Laborers	Programme should be continued		
			Yes	Yes with increased Wage	No
Nilphamari	Luxmichup	40	36 (90%)	4 (10%)	0
	Kundupukur	35	30 (86%)	5 (14%)	0
	Charaikhola	20	14 (70%)	6 (30%)	0
Jamalpur	Kulkandi	17	5 (30)	12 (70%)	0

Source: CPD's Field Investigation 2009.

Section VI _____

Conclusions and Recommendations

The experience of employment generation programmes across the world indicates that the impact and success of programmes are largely dependent on two decisive factors - design and implementation (Devereux and Solomon 2006). This was the case not only in India but in many other countries including Argentina, Botswana, Cambodia, China, Malawi, Indonesia and South Africa. Field level investigations by the CPD study team reveal that notwithstanding some dissatisfactory performance in case of targeting of beneficiaries, selection of projects and leakage of resources, the 100-DEGP, by and large, benefited the poor by providing employment and income during their hardship. In addition to its impact on poverty, this programme can also contribute to creation of developmentally useful assets such as physical infrastructure in the rural areas of Bangladesh which is essential for rural development. Therefore, policy makers will have to utilise the experience derived from the first phase of the 100-DEGP in order for it to be implemented in a more effective manner and continue it in the subsequent years, bearing in mind the paternal nature of such state-sponsored programmes.

The 100-DEGP was a well-timed intervention that sought to reduce the vulnerability of the people who have, traditionally been hit by chronic poverty and natural calamities, and even from fluctuations in global price of commodities. Attempts to overcome the shortcomings of the 100-DEGP may include addressing a number of issues which play a vital role in successful continuation of the programme, with more productive outcome in terms of poverty reduction and rural development.

Improving efficiency in fund utilisation

- The programme is large both with regard to its physical and monetary dimensions.⁸ The percentage of extreme poor to be covered in focused areas with higher vulnerability and poverty should be increased. The identification of this extreme poor needs to be done on the basis of incidence and severity of current poverty trends (HIES was done back in 2005). New poverty estimates are required especially in the backdrop of the world-wide price hike of essential commodities which saw riots in many parts of the globe, and the ongoing global financial crisis which is already hitting exports from Bangladesh. The participation in other SSNPs by the poor should also be accounted for in order to maximise complementarities and reduce duplication of efforts. It is worth mentioning here that total allocation for Phase-I was Tk. 12,000 million of which Tk. 9154.7 million was disbursed and the rest (Tk. 2845.3 million) remains untapped. Whether this leftover amount will be added to Tk. 8,000 million allocated for the Phase-II or not is not yet clear. If the remaining amount is added to the allocation for the second phase, making it Tk. 10,845.3 million, effective utilisation of this resource will be a challenge as the number of work-days has been reduced by 60 days (to 40 days). During the first phase, utilisation of resources was 76.13 per cent of total allocation. If the utilisation rate is expected to be maintained, it will require Tk. 8,271.3 million to be used within the stipulated period. This requires improvement of the programme's efficiency.
- Government may wish to integrate activities under the programme with plans of the local authorities in order to increase the development impact. It could also be linked with other government sponsored programmes.

Adequate planning and preparation

- *A comprehensive guideline:* A Guideline in a simple booklet format can be introduced which will include a 'Frequently Asked Questions' (FAQ) provision in order to clarify doubts that may arise among the common people and field-level officials. The guideline should be made available both in the print media and on the websites (perhaps, the government's gazette).
- *Awareness building:* Workshops may be organised at the field level to raise awareness among the mass population and discuss implementation issues with the involving government officials.

⁸ The first phase of the programme simultaneously covered all 64 districts in the country.

- *Extensive use of MIS:* Government may consider listing other SSNPs using the current national identity (ID) card. In addition, they may incorporate NGOs to list targeted beneficiaries of their programmes in the same way. A comprehensive MIS could facilitate the initiative. All the districts need to be taken under the automation provision. Village ICT infrastructure facilities such as the Palli Toththo type initiatives can facilitate this process and can reduce overlapping of the 100-DEGP with other SSNs, and thereby help create transparency and improve the monitoring system.
- *Allocation of more time and training for designing and planning:* More time needs to be allocated for designing the programme. If necessary, training could be initiated both for designing and implementation phases of the programme. Training for the implementing agencies such as the UP and the UNO can also be initiated for better performance of the programme.

Revisit the programme's status quo

- *Programme's objectives:* The objective of the programme needs to be revisited in order to ensure both employment generation and development works. The overarching objective should be centred on a rights based approach, and the methodology of selection process needs to be both bottom-up and top-down. The beneficiary needs to know about the need of the projects or development activities in their areas before availing the employment opportunity. Flexibility in choosing the type of activities should be incorporated so that such works are undertaken on the basis of local needs.
- *Timing of the programme:* The programme could be introduced for the whole year instead of confining it to certain time period. The UNO, through consultation with the local people, could identify the time frame and inform the higher authorities.
- *Distribution of cards:* Consistency between the objectives of the programme and the framework through which the number of cards for beneficiary per districts is allocated, needs to be made transparent.
- *Gender issue:* More focused targeting for women should be made, and minimum quota for women's participation could be introduced. The selection of activities for women may be revisited and provision of certain facilities such as drinking water and shades for small children should be made where necessary.

Selection of beneficiaries and works

- *Self selection of beneficiaries:* Like the Indian approach, the government may revisit selection of beneficiary adopting self selection process where individuals would need to apply for the programme. The government, using the MIS, would then be able to exclude those unqualified.
- *Coverage of work area:* Flexibility provisions could be introduced to allow the workers to work beyond their own districts and thereby enhancing the programme's coverage to municipal areas.
- *Local development plans and environmental concerns:* These ought to be broadened in order to create room for wider scope of works. Designing and approval of the projects need to be taken care of the environmental concerns.
- *Introduction of mechanism for absentee of the programme:* The government may consider defining a mechanism for excluding beneficiaries that are absent for a given number of days (and not replaced by an alternate member of the same household) as a way to allow alternative beneficiaries who are most committed (and/or more in need) to replace those that do not fully participate in the programme.
- *Revisit age range:* Age selection needs to be revisited in order to allow people who are between the ages of 50 to 65 (since old age allowance starts from the age of 65). In rural

areas, people in the above-mentioned age range are still considered to be capable of carrying out such types of work. This would also directly promote 'elderly empowerment'.

- *Addressing low productivity:* Field observation revealed the low productivity due to nature of the work (provider's complaint about the beneficiaries views recognized as a relief). The GoB could consider introducing piece-rate wage system in order to motivate the workers to earn more by working extra hours.

Resource requirements and financing

- *Daily payment vs. weekly payment:* Given the scale of the programme, the system of daily payment of wages may be reconsidered as it is expensive and also difficult to manage. Weekly or bi-weekly payment, such as in the Indian programme, may be considered after ensuring that this satisfies the needs of the ultra poor who are able to buy food after receiving their daily wage.
- *Payment through bank or post office:* Payment provision through banking channel or post office needs to be explored. This will make the programme transparent and empower the poor, especially women, with ownership of wealth.
- *Provision of additional human and financial resources:* Resources may be allocated for the administration of the program in order to co-equal the increase in work load. Tag officers are reluctant due to a severe lack of motivation; in other words, there are no incentives that induce them to remain committed to their work. Though all the unions were allocated the same amount for administrative costs, the magnitude of each union is different and thus, the administrative cost needs to be placed in line with the size of the union.

Monitoring

- *Enhanced monitoring system:* There is scope for improvement in the contents of the monitoring information collected by the Government as well in the effectiveness of the monitoring processes. In the short run, for example, the frequency of the Daily Achievement Report may be decreased to a weekly basis (BRAC 2009).
- *Incorporation of new institutional mechanisms:* Apart from the current concerned ministry (MoFDM), monitoring could also be jointly done with the Ministry of Employment. A separate wing in the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management could be introduced. Greater collaboration at the Ministry level would minimise duplication of work and ensure greater transparency.
- *Mechanism for addressing complaints:* A systematic method of grievance recording needs to be placed. A weekly meeting can be organised when beneficiaries and providers will gather to share thoughts, ideas and resolve their problems.

Immediate doables for Phase - II of the 100-DEGP

- *Beneficiary targeting:* List of the beneficiaries need to be revisited incorporating the excluded. The individual from the richer quintile, if included, needs to be immediately excluded. This will make the programme more needs oriented and make people aware about the strict monitoring aspects.
- *Introduction of a joint task force to implement the second phase:* The second phase of the programme needs to make use of the unutilized money from the first phase. A joint task force could be constituted in order to advise on the proper utilisation and monitoring of the programme.
- *Completion of undertaken projects:* Completion of the already initiated projects would be a challenge for the newly elected government. Revisiting ongoing projects could be done in

order to check whether those can be completed on time or not. Projects could then be selected keeping in mind of the duration, local needs and available manpower.

- *Completion of incomplete days from the first phase:* Unfinished work days (mostly 10 days on average) of the first phase needs to be not only carried over, but more crucially, completed in the second phase. This work could be completed using the weekend. Local authorities could be authorized to plan along with the extra day if necessary keeping in mind of the demand for labour.
- *Monitoring:* A Visit Book need to be maintained in each project area. Voter ID number need to be incorporated in the list (at the UNO office) of the registered beneficiaries.
- *Financing:*
 - ✓ The card which has not been distributed among the beneficiaries needs to be handed out immediately.
 - ✓ Financial aspects need to be ensured in order to disburse the wages on time as stated in the Guideline. The wage payment structure could be remodeled in the next fiscal, subject to fulfillment of other criteria.
 - ✓ Beneficiaries who have claimed for their unpaid money needs to be subject of investigation, and if needed, the amount could be provided from the money received from the accused persons (Members/Chairmen or others)
 - ✓ Provision for additional human and financial resources may be allocated with the primary objective of successfully implementing the huge remaining part of the programme.

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